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How and why stock prices move is a centuries-old question still not answered conclusively. More
recently, attention shifted to higher frequencies, where trades are processed piecewise across different
timescales. Here we reveal that price impact has a universal non-linear shape for trades aggregated
on any intra-day scale. Its shape varies little across instruments, but drastically different master
curves are obtained for order volume and -sign impact. The scaling is largely determined by the
relevant Hurst exponents. We further show that extreme order flow imbalance is not associated
with large returns. To the contrary, it is observed when the price is “pinned” to a particular level.
Prices move only when there is sufficient balance in the local order flow. In fact, the probability
that a trade changes the mid-price falls to zero with increasing (absolute) order-sign bias along
an arc-shaped curve for all intra-day scales. Our findings challenge the widespread assumption of
linear aggregate impact. They imply that market dynamics on all intra-day timescales are shaped
by correlations and bilateral adaptation in the flows of liquidity provision and taking.
CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1
II. The Data 2
III. Results 3
A. Aggregate Impact 3
B. Scaling & Hurst Exponents 4
C. Large Order Imbalances & Pinned Prices 5
IV. Discussion 6
Acknowledgments 8
References 8
Appendices 9
A. Single trade impacts 9
B. Impact curves for 30 instruments 9
C. Change probability curves for 30 instruments 10
I. INTRODUCTION
Markets allow different sources of information to be
processed and transformed into a single number: the
price. Since these market prices in turn play an im-
portant signalling role for the rest of the economy, the
efficiency of the price formation process is a highly rele-
vant question. Equilibrium models explain some general
features of asset prices in a formally elegant way with-
out considering the detailed price formation process [1–3].
∗ felix@neuro.uni-bremen.de
There is, however, growing evidence that financial mar-
kets are almost never in equilibrium and that prices re-
flect more than fundamental information [4–7]. Instead,
the flow of demand and supply, information and opin-
ions is only slowly digested, one transaction at a time [8].
Understanding such dynamics is of great importance for
practitioners optimising their trading strategies, as well
as for exchanges and regulators interested in improving
market efficiency and stability.
In modern electronic markets, participants interact
through a limit order book (LOB) in a continuous
double-auction. Some market participants act as liquid-
ity providers by placing limit orders (buy or sell) in the
LOB. Other market participants act as liquidity takers:
they need to execute their trades immediately, and cor-
respondingly trigger transactions by sending market or-
ders. These market orders tend to impact prices: statis-
tically, a buy (resp. sell) market order pushes the price
upwards (resp. downwards).
While the average price impact of single market or-
ders is relatively well understood, the impact of a series
of market orders is much more complex. For example,
a perplexing empirical result is the square-root volume
dependence of the impact of a metaorder, i.e., a sequence
of individual orders belonging to the same trading de-
cision that cannot be executed in a single transaction
but must instead be fragmented (see e.g. [8, 9] and refs.
therein)1. This result is at odds with, e.g., the classical
Kyle model of impact which predicts a linear dependence
on volume [11]. The empirical analysis of metaorders is
difficult since it requires a proprietary database, where
the trades belonging to a given trading decision can be
identified. When such data is available, the square-root
1 Apparent deviations for very short or long time scales, possibly
due to conditioning or undersampling, are still debated. See e.g.
[10].
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2impact law seems to be universally vindicated, for a wide
variety of markets, epochs and trading styles.
Most available datasets are, however, anonymized:
while the sign  and volume v of each market order can be
reconstructed (see section II), the identity of the trader
(or of the trading institution) at the origin of the market
order is usually unknown. One can nevertheless define
the aggregate impact RN over N consecutive trades as
the average price return, conditioned to a certain total
volume imbalance QN defined as:
QN =
N∑
i=1
qi, qi := ivi, (1)
where qi is the signed volume of the i
th trade (see Eq. 2
below for complete definitions). Although the impact of
a single trade is well known to be a strongly concave
function of its volume, it is reported that the aggregate
impact of N trades becomes linear in Q as N increases
[8, 12].
This picture, however, is quite incomplete as we reveal
in this empirical paper. We show that once correctly
rescaled, and for N >∼ 10, the aggregate impact function
exhibits a non-linear, sigmoidal shape that is approxi-
mately independent of the number of transactions N and
of the chosen asset (large tick stocks, small tick stocks,
futures).
We also study the aggregate-sign impact, where the
conditioning variable is not QN but rather the sign im-
balance EN =
∑N
i=1 i. Scaling is again observed in this
case, now with an impact function that reverts back to
zero at both extremes.
After quantifying the rescaling of the aggregate im-
pact curves over different time-horizons, we investigate
why the price-impact for extreme order-sign imbalances
reverts towards zero. We find that the local bias of the
order signs and the probability that an order changes the
price compensate each other to a very high degree. Al-
though possibly anticipated on general grounds, this ef-
fect does not seem to have been quantitatively reported
so far, and has very fundamental and important conse-
quences on the dynamics of markets.
The present paper is mostly about empirical observa-
tions. The ability of currently available models to de-
scribe quantitatively the scaling properties of the non-
linear aggregate impact curves will be the topic of a com-
panion paper [13].
II. THE DATA
Our dataset contains the highest turnover instruments
on three different platforms, namely:
• 12 technology stocks on the US primary NASDAQ
market, for the years 2011 to 2016. This includes
some of the most traded stocks in the world like
Apple (AAPL) and Microsoft (MSFT).
• the 13 highest turnover stocks on NASDAQ OMX
NORDIC (called just OMX in the following), which
covers the Nordic markets Stockholm, Helsinki, and
Copenhagen for October 2011 until end of Septem-
ber 2015. OMX is the primary market for the se-
lected stocks.
• 6 futures on EUREX EBS (BOBL, BUND, DAX,
EUROSTOXX, SCHATZ, SMI) for October 2014
until the end of 2015.
We chose to analyse three different platforms in order
to have some variability in terms of market microstruc-
ture in the sample while keeping the complexity of the
data preparation manageable. The instruments were se-
lected for their high turnover, reasonable concentration
on their primary markets, quality of the data, and avail-
ability via the same provider for the entire period that
was analysed: WOMBAT for NASDAQ, NOMURA for
OMX, and the exchange itself for the EUREX data.
The NASDAQ stocks are also traded on different US-
markets and trades are routed automatically to the best
offer. Nevertheless, we chose to not aggregate several
US-markets, because they are frequently desynchronised
at the millisecond scale [14, 15], leading to inconsistent
aggregate bid- and ask-prices, that is, the best visible
buy and sell limit orders, respectively, as reported by
the market just before each transaction is executed. We
found that the microstructural parameter η ∈ [0, 1] ap-
pears to be a good measure of the importance of price-
discretisation.2 Prices on NASDAQ are discretised with
a fixed tick-size of $0.01, which can be considered very
small (η = 0.73) to medium (η = 0.49) for the analysed
stocks. Up to roughly one third of the transactions were
executed against hidden liquidity.
Stocks on OMX are only traded on one of the Nordic
markets at a time, and much less fragmented than US
stocks. Tick-sizes vary with price and are effectively
larger (0.24 ≤ η ≤ 0.50) than for NASDAQ. Here, hid-
den liquidity represents a vanishingly small fraction of all
traded volume and seems to be concentrated on the mid.
Finally, the EUREX futures are not traded on other plat-
forms at all. Tick-sizes vary considerably between mod-
erately large (η = 0.44) and extremely large (η = 0.03).
In the following, we calculate price-returns rt =
logmt+1 − logmt from the mid-prices m defined as the
average of the bid-price and the ask-price just before each
transaction.
We constructed order-signs by labelling all trades
above the mid-price as  = +1 and all trades below
2 η := Nc/(2Na), where Nc is the number of subsequent price-
movements in same direction (continuations) and Na the number
of price-movements in alternating directions. It measures the
effect of discretisation of a diffusion process. η > 0.5 corresponds
to small-tick instruments and η < 0.5 to large-tick instruments.
[16]
3as  = −1. Trades exactly at the mid-price were dis-
carded. We decided not to use the signs provided by
the exchanges themselves because hidden liquidity is not
correctly labeled on NASDAQ for a part of the analysed
period. Nevertheless, we confirmed all the following re-
sults using the exchange-provided signs, with only very
minor quantitative differences. Trade-ids were only avail-
able from EUREX. Therefore, we merged all transactions
based on the timestamps, which were reported with mil-
lisecond precision for all three platforms (see also ap-
pendix A).
Trading volumes vary considerably over time. To con-
trol for extremely active days, we normalised aggregate
transaction volumes Q = 〈QD〉/QD
∑
i qi by the daily
volume QD relative to its average. This global normali-
sation will be omitted in the following equations for no-
tational simplicity.
The first 30 minutes after opening and before closing
on each day are discarded, as well as all days with short-
ened trading-hours. Obviously irregular entries were dis-
carded too, such as transactions labelled as irregular by
the exchange or provider, transactions outside the afore-
mentioned hours, or transactions with non-finite prices
(including bid- and ask-prices).
III. RESULTS
A. Aggregate Impact
As mentioned in the introduction, we measure the
aggregate-volume impact as
RN (Q) :=
〈
logmt+N − logmt
∣∣∣Q = N−1∑
i=0
qt+i
〉
, (2)
where mt is the mid-price immediately before the t
th
transaction, qt the signed volume of the t
th transaction
and 〈. . . 〉 denotes an empirical average over all time win-
dows containing N successive trades, executed the same
day. R1(Q) corresponds to the average impact of a sin-
gle market order of signed volume Q as studied in, e.g.,
[8, 17].
As expected, both width and height of the function
RN (Q) increase with N . However, if one rescales the
Q-axis with an N -dependent volume scale QN , and the
R-axis with an N -dependent return scale RN , all curves
for N >∼ 10 collapse to a single master curve, as shown in
Figure 1 for AAPL, and in Appendix B for a variety of
other assets. More precisely, one finds that empirically:
RN (Q) ≈ RNF
( Q
QN
)
, (3)
where QN and RN both obey power-law scaling with N ,
QN ≈ Q1Nξ, (4)
RN ≈ R1Nψ, (5)
and the scaling function F (x) is a sigmoidal function
parameterized as
F (x) =
x
(1 + |x|α)β/α , (6)
where α and β are fitting parameters that describe the
shape of F (x). Note that for x → 0, the leading be-
haviour is:
F (x) = x− β
α
sign(x)|x|1+α + . . . , (7)
i.e., a linear behaviour with possibly non-analytic correc-
tions.
For x→∞, on the other hand, one has:
F (x) = sign(x)|x|1−β + . . . . (8)
Hence β = 1 corresponds to saturation for large volumes,
β < 1 to continued growth, and β > 1 to reversal towards
lower impacts.
In order to determine the rescaling exponents ξ and ψ,
the shape of RN (Q) is fitted for each N using the scaling
form Eq. (3) with F (x) given by Eq. (6), keeping the
same value of α and β for all N . 3 We obtained α = 1.2±
0.6, β = 1.3 ± 0.7 for the mean and standard deviation
of the fitted RN (Q) across all instruments in the sample.
The corresponding scaling function for AAPL is shown
as a dashed line in Fig. 1.4
Once F (x) is fixed, one can map out the scale factors
QN and RN as a function of N , which are described very
accurately by power-laws of N as shown in Fig. 2.5 The
final rescaled impact functions are shown in Fig. 7 of Ap-
pendix B for other stocks and futures. All scaling curves
look remarkably similar, as indicated by the similar val-
ues of α and β in all cases. Any theoretical approach will
have to explain not only the value of the exponents ξ and
ψ, but also of the full master curve F (x).
Together with the rescaled aggregate-volume impact,
Fig. 1 shows the corresponding cumulative distribution
of volume, rescaled by QN . Events far in the saturation
regime occur with probability ∼ 10−2 on a daily basis.
This must be compared with the typical number of trades
3 Technically, this was achieved by alternating between fitting ei-
ther the scales or the shape parameters and using nonlinear re-
gression. Only 80% of all N were randomly included in each
pass.
4 Some instruments exhibit a slight reversal of the aggregate-
volume impact R(Q) for very large arguments. These are some-
times fitted with quite large β, but the fitted curve only strongly
reverts outside of the observed range of Q. This is in very differ-
ent from R(E) discussed below, which strongly reverts close to
zero impact within the frequently observed range of sign imbal-
ances E.
5 This was done using robust regression. We also tried to fit the
power-law rescaling without using parametric curves as an in-
between step, but failed to achieve the same level of reliability
across instruments and time periods.
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FIG. 1. AAPL on NASDAQ in 2016. Upper row, left: rescaled expected return RN (Q/Nξ)/Nψ conditioned of the volume
imbalance Q for different bin sizes N in arbitrary units (see eqns. 2, ff.). X- and y-axis rescaling exponents: ξ = 0.84, ψ = 0.53.
Right: rescaled mean return RN (E/Nψ)/Nψ conditioned on the sign imbalance E (see eq. 9). ξ = 0.69, ψ = 0.48. Lower
row: the corresponding complementary cumulative distributions. The positive and negative half were calculated independently
and then binned to smooth out noise and discretisation steps for small N . The largest shown N corresponds to the shortest
day in the sample.
per day, which is of the order of 104 for AAPL. For exam-
ple, there about 100 events per day at the end of a bin of
size N = 100 and within the saturation regime. Events
contributing to the saturation regime are relatively fre-
quent, and the effect is therefore not anecdotal.
The right-hand panel of Fig. 1 shows the rescaled
aggregate-sign impact, defined as:
RN (E) :=
〈
logmt+N − logmt
∣∣∣ E = N−1∑
i=0
t+i
〉
. (9)
Here, the impact for small sign imbalances is more lin-
ear than for the volume imbalance, corresponding to a
larger value of the effective parameter α. Around a sign
imbalance of 50%, the impact saturates sharply and re-
verts towards zero at the extremes. This may come as a
surprise since it means that a very strong imbalance in
the order-signs is associated to a very small price change
on average. This effect is found for all instruments, and
also for the trade imbalance, as shown in Figures 8 and 9
in Appendix B. The reason for this highly peculiar be-
haviour is investigated below. First, however, we have a
closer look at the scaling exponents ξ and ψ (and their
counterpart for the aggregate-sign impact ξ and ψ).
B. Scaling & Hurst Exponents
Figure 3 shows the means and standard deviations for
several scaling exponents. The scaling exponent of the
width QN of the aggregate-volume impact is found close
to ξ ≈ 0.75 while the exponent governing the height RN
is ψ ≈ 0.5. In other words, the width of the impact curve
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FIG. 2. AAPL in 2016. Top: Volume scales QN for the im-
pact curves (see eq. 3) that were fitted to each bin-size for
the same data shown in the upper left part of Fig. 1. Solid
line: power-law fit used for the rescaling along the volume-
imbalance axis. Bottom: The same analysis but for the re-
turn scale RN , i.e. the scaling of the impact curve along
the return axis. Note that the preceding fitting of the im-
pact curves, yielding QN and RN for each N , did not impose
any assumptions on their scaling. Relative fitting errors are
below 1%, but variability across instruments and periods is
much larger (see below).
grows faster than its height when the bin size is increased.
Very similar values are found for the aggregate-sign im-
pacts (exponents ξ and ψ). Note that using Eqs. (3)
and (6), the slope of the linear region of impact follows
as ∂RN (Q)/∂Q|Q=0 = RN/QN . It scales as N−κ with
κ = ξ−ψ ≈ 0.25, i.e. it decreases with N as a power-law
N .6
Since both RN and QN are sums over random vari-
ables (resp. returns and signed volumes), one expects
that their natural scaling withN is governed by the Hurst
exponents of the underlying variables r and q. Here we
define the Hurst exponent H of a zero-mean random vari-
able x from the scaling of the standard deviation of sums
of N successive events:〈(
N∑
i=1
xi
)2〉
:= DN2Hx , (10)
where D is a constant and where we take advantage of the
fact that returns and signed volumes have a zero average
over long time-horizons.7 As usual, H = 0.5 corresponds
to regular diffusion, H < 0.5 to sudiffusion, and H > 0.5
to superdiffusion.
6 The cross-instrument dispersion of κ around its average 〈κ〉 =
0.23 is actually relatively small: std(κ) = 0.10.
7 This method turned out to be more robust than the standard
rescaled range analysis. The reason is that returns and volumes
follow very heavy-tailed distributions, to which the range is much
Returns are almost diffusive with a very slight ten-
dency for mean-reversion (particularly for large-tick in-
struments). This is consistent with ψ and ψ. Volume
signs are only slightly positively correlated, at least when
measured through Hq. Order signs are (as is well known)
strongly correlated with H > 0.7, close to the values of
ξ and ξ. This implies that the scales of the aggregate
impact curves are mostly determined by the accumulated
variation in the return- and sign- time series. Interest-
ingly, the scaling of the impact curves is not trivially re-
lated to the Hurst exponent of volume fluctuations, but
rather to sign fluctuations. This is expected from the
fact that the volume of individual orders exhibits extreme
variability that mostly reflects the available liquidity at
the best price [18–20]. Large fluctuations of order vol-
umes v introduce an independent source of noise that
masks part of the order-sign correlations when measur-
ing Hq in the way described above (see [21] for a related
discussion).
On the right-hand panel in Fig. 3, significant cross cor-
relations across instruments between the different scaling
exponents are shown.8 We find positive correlations be-
tween ξ and Hq as well as between ψ and Hr, offering
some reassurance that the similar average values (left-
hand pane) are more than a pure coincidence. We also
find positive correlations between ξ and H. However,
there are no significant correlations between ψ and Hr,
or between H and Hq. This hints at a quite complex
interplay of several factors driving the variability in the
different scaling behaviors across instruments. H is neg-
atively correlated with Hr, which implies more order-
splitting on more mean-reverting, larger tick instruments.
Remember, though, that Hr only varies very little across
instruments (Fig. 3).9,10
C. Large Order Imbalances & Pinned Prices
As stated before, extreme order-sign imbalance is not
associated with large returns. To the contrary, such large
more sensitive than the sum. It is also simpler than detrended
fluctuation analysis, which did not seem to be beneficial in this
particular use case.
8 Note that the square of the cross correlation can also be inter-
preted as the coefficient of determination R2 of a linear regression
with intercept.
9 We found consistent results measuring order-sign autocorrela-
tions directly (not shown). The latter decay with an exponent
γ ≈ 0.5 for long lags. They often exhibit a steeper initial de-
cay, however. Correlations for γ and other exponents are similar
to H, but generally weaker even though γ varies more across
assets.
10 We also found that the “implied spread” η (see [16] and footnote
2) seems to be informative (not shown). It varies considerably
across instruments (see section II) and is strongly correlated with
several exponents. It shares these correlations with the return-
sign Hurst-exponent. This finding seems to be related to the
co-occurrence of larger H± and a larger fraction of trend contin-
uations Nc.
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FIG. 3. Left: Analysis of the distributions of several scaling exponents. Plotted symbols: means. Vertical lines: standard
deviations. Both were calculated over instruments, for each of which the exponents were calculated for all 1-year periods before
averaging. Blue dots correspond to the scaling of a variable that a price-impact is typically conditioned on, i.e. the with of
an impact curve along the x-axis. Green triangles correspond to the scaling of a variable measuring price changes, i.e. the
height along the y-axis. Variables left to right: Volume imbalance and corresponding return rescaling ξ, ψ. Sign imbalance
and corresponding return rescaling ξ, ψ. Hurst exponents of the Volume imbalance Hq, returns Hr, order-signs H, and
return signs H± (see eq. 10). Right: Cross-correlation calculated over all instruments for the same variables. Only correlations
differing from zero by more then 3 std are shown.
imbalances are observed when the price is “pinned” to a
particular level. A typical example is shown in Fig. 4.
Around trade 9100, a series of more than 100 market sell
orders arrives, yet the mid-price only bounces up and
down half a tick as liquidity providers replenish limit buy
orders at the best price or inside of the spread (the dis-
tance between the best bid- and the ask price). Many of
these trades are quite small, but some are significantly
larger as liquidity takers adapt to the available volume
at the best.
The mid-price only diffuses freely when market trades
happen on both sides of the book. The upper panel in
Fig. 5 shows the probability of a mid-price change be-
tween two subsequent trades as a function of the average
order sign in the bin, ¯ := E/N . One of the central re-
sults of this paper is that biased order-signs lead to a
lower probability for price changes on any intra-day time
scale. Note in particular that the price-change probabil-
ity has an almost invariant triangular shape for all bin
sizes of N >∼ 50. It approaches zero for highly biased
order signs. The qualitative behaviour is the same for
smaller N , although the curve is broader and smoother,
and has a flatter maximum around ¯ = 0. This behaviour
is universal across all instruments (see Appendix C for
more examples). The corresponding cumulative distribu-
tion is shown in the lower pane, confirming that strong
order-sign imbalances happen relatively frequently on a
daily basis. The non-intuitive negative correlation be-
tween sign imbalance and return is therefore not an arte-
fact due to a lack of data.
IV. DISCUSSION
We investigated how prices are impacted by the flow
of market orders and found a universal behaviour on all
intra-day time scales. We have shown that the impact
curves, once correctly rescaled, are remarkably stable
across time scales (from bins of N = 10 trades up to
an entire day of trading, beyond which overnight effects
would have to be taken into a account) and instruments
(large & small tick US stocks, Nordic stocks, EUREX
futures). This illustrates how measuring master curves
instead of either scaling laws for scalar quantities or con-
ditional expectation curves on individual timescales can
substantially improve the insights gained on market dy-
namics. To fully appreciate the master curves’ robust-
ness, we kindly encourage the reader to read the appen-
dices below. Our results suggest that the price formation
process in financial markets is the result of some gen-
eral, universal mechanism. While the latter is still to be
elicited, our findings do provide some hints.
We find that the aggregate-volume impact saturates
for large (rescaled) imbalances, on all time scales. The
behaviour of the aggregate-sign impact is even more
striking: highly biased order flows are associated with
very small price changes. More precisely, we find that
the probability for an order to change the price decreases
with the local imbalance, and vanishes when the order
signs are locally strongly biased in one direction. At high
frequencies, extreme order-sign imbalances occur when a
very large volume is available on the opposite side of the
order book, resulting in prices being temporarily pinned
to a certain level. These large volumes manifest them-
selves either as visible large limit orders or as repeated
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independent market orders submitted to the market. Lower solid curve: 50 trade sign imbalance (causal).
refills near a particular price-level.
Qualitatively, this dependence of the price-change
probabilities on average order signs is consistent with
models and empirical results in the literature. For ex-
ample, the Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model [22]
postulates that the change of price is proportional to the
sign “surprise”, i.e. the difference between the sign  of
a market order and its expected value, based on previous
signs. When it is extremely likely that the next trade is a
buy, and a buy trade indeed materializes, then the price
change is small. Empirically, many studies have reported
that returns in the direction of a particular trade-sign
predictor are on average lower than those in the opposite
direction (see e.g. [23–25]). This effect is attributed to
liquidity takers adjusting their market order volume at
the outstanding liquidity, while liquidity providers revise
their limit orders and refill to match the incoming or-
der bias. Our results show a connection to the aggregate
price-impact and a direct measure of the aforementioned,
hypothesised bilateral order-flow adaptation. The prob-
ability of price changes as a function of local sign imbal-
ance becomes (for large N) a tent-shaped function that
has a discontinuous slope for zero imbalance and vanishes
for strong imbalances. This observation is consistent with
[12] where a similar shape was reported for the standard
deviation of price-changes in 15 minute windows for US
stocks traded in 1994–1995, i.e. before electronic markets
and High-Frequency algorithms.
Taken together, our findings suggest that markets gen-
erally operate in a state where traders collectively coun-
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FIG. 5. EUROSTOXX on EUREX in 2015. Upper row: the
probability P (R 6= 0|N−1E) that the mid-price changes from
one trade to the next conditioned on the mean trade sign in
the bin containing N trades. Lower row: the corresponding
complementary cumulative distributions.
terbalance the impact of predictable events to a very high
degree, and on all intra-day timescales. Since market-
order volumes are known to be highly conditioned on
visible liquidity (see e.g. [20]), the dependence of market
order signs on repeated refills (as shown in Fig. 4) should
not come as a surprise: these observation simply con-
firm that liquidity takers pay attention to the currently
available liquidity. Reciprocally, liquidity providers ob-
serve the flow of market orders and adapt their behavior
to the well-known long-range correlations of order-signs
(see [21] for a related discussion).
In this scenario, price fluctuations mostly reflect the a
lack of predictability, or “surprise” of an event. Dynam-
ics of this type have previously been shown to be capa-
ble of generating clustered volatility and extreme price-
jumps in stylised multi-agent systems [26] and in highly
adaptive control systems in [27]. Therefore, the present
work provides a first step towards more directly testable
models along these lines, and suggests that the classi-
cal notion of market efficiency [28] should be extended
to include endogenous information on top of exogeneous
news.
In a forthcoming paper [13], we will investigate in
detail how accurately the nonlinear master curves and
rescaling exponents described above can be reproduced
using propagator models [29] and their generalisations
[30, 31]. Our results provide important constraints for
such models, and for realistic market models in general,
since they quantify how the market reacts to both order
bias and price-change probability on all intra-day time
scales. Naturally, such improved impact models are of in-
terest both for practitioners trying to reduce their trading
costs and for regulators trying to understand the stability
of markets.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Single trade impacts
Fig. 6 shows mid-price-impacts for single (estimated)
trades for different instruments. The impacts are dom-
inated by a step at the origin and a highly concave de-
pendency on volume. In other words: The one-trade im-
pact strongly depends on the direction of the trade and
much less on its volume. In practice, it is challenging
to measure the true one-trade impact because it is not
known which transactions belong to the same trade. As
shown in the lowest row, merging transactions with the
same signs and timestamps (solid lines) aggregates more
trades than merging based on the trade id reported by
the exchange (dashed lines). Unfortunately, since most
available data does not contain trade-ids, one usually can
only calculate an N -trade impact with a small N > 1.
Since we consider aggregate trades for N >∼ 10 in the fol-
lowing, however, this slight underestimation of the true
sizes of the aggregation bins should only lead to minor
quantitative differences. Note that the impacts could be
measured using the transaction price instead of the mid-
price. In this case, the one-trade impact is dominated
by the bid-ask-bounce and the aggregate impact quickly
converges towards the one for the mid-price (not shown).
Appendix B: Impact curves for 30 instruments
Fig. 7 shows aggregate order-volume-impacts for differ-
ent instruments, for different N , and rescaled according
to Eq. 3. Aggregate impact is never fully linear and ex-
hibits a universal shape on all intra-day scales of each in-
strument with small difference across instruments. Most
notably, small tick instruments (like AAPL and GOOG)
tend to have a saturating impact or even a small over-
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shoot while large-tick instruments (like MSFT, the nordic
stocks and the futures), do not fully saturate for large im-
balances.
Fig. 8 shows aggregate order-sign-impacts for for differ-
ent instruments. Similar results are found for the trade-
imbalance in Figure 8. The only exception are the DAX
futures, which seem to exhibit reverting impacts condi-
tioned on large order-sign imbalances but not for large
trade imbalances.
Appendix C: Change probability curves for 30
instruments
Fig. 10 shows the price-change probability for different
instruments. To emphasize the approximate invariance
of the curve over a wide range of bin sizes for all but
the most small-tick instruments, we here set the lowest
bin-size to 32.
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NBH NOK1V NOVO SANDA TLIA VOLVB
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FIG. 6. Single-trade impacts as a function of the order volume imbalance. First two rows: NASDAQ stocks, 2012-2016. Rows
three and four: OMX stocks, 2012-2016. Lowest row: EUREX futures (10/2014-12/2015). Solid lines: estimated trade-sign.
Dotted lines: exchange-provided trade-signs (not available for hidden liquidity on NASDAQ). Dashed lines: exchange-provided
sign and trade-id (only EUREX).
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FIG. 7. Price impact as a function of the order volume imbalance. The raw point-clouds were quantile-binned along the
imbalance axis. Therefore the curves have a constant noise level but a range of imbalances that changes with the temporal bin
size N . Instruments and years as in Fig. 6.
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FIG. 8. Price impact as a function of the order sign imbalance. Instruments and years as in Fig. 6.
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FIG. 9. Price impact as a function of the trade imbalance. Instruments and years as in Fig. 6.
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FIG. 10. Probability (within a bin) that the mid-price changes between two trades vs the mean sign. Instruments and years
as in Fig. 6.
